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I. INTRODUCTION
To many competition experts, the failure to include competition policy
in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") Trade
Negotiation at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 2003 marked
the end of the only hope of establishing a global competition policy regime.
Yet more and more countries are adopting national competition laws with
or without a comprehensive agreement on competition policy from the
WTO. The International Competition Network, an international body
devoted exclusively to competition law enforcement, now boasts members
consisting of ninety-three competition authorities from eighty-two
countries. Of these, over twenty became members in 2004.1 While some
countries enacted competition laws to fulfill commitments made in bilateral
free trade agreements, others did so voluntarily, often with the assistance of
bilateral donors or international organizations such as the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") and the World Bank.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN")2 exemplifies
this phenomenon quite well. By 1998, not one member of ASEAN had
developed its own competition law. Today, Thailand, Indonesia,
Singapore, and Vietnam all have full-fledged national competition laws in
place. To date, with the exception of Thailand, the enactment of
competition laws in ASEAN countries resulted from international
Thailand Development Research Institute.
1 Ulf Bige, President of the Bundeskartellamt, Speech at Opening Ceremony of the Fifth
United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (Nov. 14-
18, 2005), http://www.unctadxi.org/Sections/AntalyaConference/docs/Conference
Presentations/tdrbpayt05039_en.pdf.
2 ASEAN is comprised of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
3 Since 1979 Thailand has had a quasi-competition law but with limited substantive
provisions on restrictive practices.
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commitments rather than from domestic policy. Indonesia passed its law in
1999 to comply with certain conditions set by the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") imposed after the 1996 Asian financial crisis. 4 Singapore
passed its law in early 2005 to fulfill its obligations under the U.S.-
Singapore bilateral free trade agreement. 5 Vietnam enacted its law in June
2005 to fulfill WTO accession commitments.6 The question is whether
having a national competition law helps promote a more competitive
market environment.
Thailand's experience illustrates that having a competition law may
prove futile if enforcement cannot withstand political hurdles.
Discriminatory and arbitrary implementation of the law may also serve to
distort rather than promote effective competition in the market. Hopefully,
lessons learned from Thailand can help identify prerequisites for successful
competition law enforcement in countries considering adopting such a law.
This paper will address the political economy of competition law in
Thailand. Section II will provide a historical perspective of Thai
Competition Law. Section III will show what went wrong with the law's
implementation since its promulgation in 1999. Section IV will assess the
implications of the lack of competition law enforcement on business
conduct and the establishment of a competition regime in Thailand. Section
V will summarize major lessons learned in the Thai case that may be
relevant to other developing countries considering adopting such a law or
facing difficulties in its implementation. Finally, Section VI will draw
conclusions on how a country can ensure successful enforcement of a
competition law in the absence of a political will.
II. THE THAI COMPETITION LAW 1N A NUTSHELL
Thailand has had a quasi-competition law since 1979, known as the
Price Control and Anti-Monopoly Act.7  At its inception, the law's
4 Conditionality provisions do not appear in Thailand's Letters of Intent. Letters from
Bank of Thailand to the International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/
extemal/country/tha/?type=23.
5 Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, Pub. L. 108-78,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/FinalTexts/asset_u
pload file708_4036.pdf. Chapter 12 of the Agreement addresses anti-competitive business
conduct, designated monopolies and government enterprises.
6 The promulgation of the competition law was part of Vietnam's action plan on law
building submitted to the WTO that included the legislation and amendments of thirty-six
laws and ordinances. Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam in the Process of
Accession to the World Trade Organization, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/ttbaochi/
nr041126171753/ns050223102713 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (details regarding Vietnam's
accession commitments).
7 Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act, Thailand, Apr. 22, 1979 (1979),
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/Laws/thailand.htm.
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objective was to protect consumers from inflationary pressures and from
widespread collusive practices among businesses that had led to excessive
pricing. The provisions concerning anti-competitive practices were
incomplete, as they did not cover mergers and many important vertical
restrictive practices. Implementing a price control mechanism was easy,
but the Department of Internal Trade, a part of the Ministry of Commerce,
hardly enforced the anti-monopoly provisions. This limited enforcement
situation existed because the law required that the Department of Internal
Trade officially declare a business accused of anti-competitive practices a
"controlled business" before the law could be enforced. During the two
decades that the law was in effect, the competition authority only declared
one such business, an ice manufacturing company, a "controlled business"
because there were no clear rules or guidelines for officially classifying
such anti-competitive businesses as "controlled businesses."
In 1999, two years after the Asian economic crisis, the Parliament
passed the national competition law. As mentioned earlier, the
promulgation of the national competition law in Thailand was voluntary. It
was not part of the IMF conditions, as in Indonesia, or part of a bilateral
free trade commitment, as in Singapore, or a WTO accession commitment,
as in Vietnam. Hence, the law received minimal technical assistance from
international organizations such as the World Bank or UNCTAD.
According to Suthee Supanit, a law professor at Thammasat University in
Bangkok who was part of the drafting committee, the adoption of the New
Constitution in October 1997 enabled the ratification of the Trade
Competition Act.8 Article 50 of the New Constitution ensures citizens the
right to engage in free and fair competition, while Article 87 stipulates that
the State shall pursue a free economic system through market forces, ensure
and supervise fair competition, prevent direct and indirect monopolies and
refrain from engaging in businesses in competition with the private sector.
The promulgation of the competition law was seen as a necessary tool to
fulfill the mandate established by the New Constitution to advocate for free
and fair competition. 9
The Thai Trade Competition Act of 1999 established the Trade
Competition Commission responsible for the implementation of the law and
the Office of Trade Competition Commission as the secretariat body. The
office resides within the Ministry of Commerce. The Act contains all of the
major substantive provisions found in most competition laws, including
abuse of dominance provisions in Section 25, merger control provisions in
8 Thailand Report from Sutee Supanit to the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (2002) (on
file with the Fair Trade Commission of Japan), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/02/
thailandjr.pdf.
9 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Thailand (1997), available at
http://www.krisdika.go.th (in English).
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Section 26, collusive practice provisions in Section 27 and unfair trade
practice provisions in Section 29.10 Besides a few horizontal restrictions,
such as price fixing, quantity fixing, and bid rigging, other restrictive
practices are governed by a rule of reason."' Section 4 of the law also
provides exemptions for state enterprises, co-operatives and agricultural co-
operatives, central and regional government agencies, and other businesses
prescribed by Ministerial Regulations. 12 In part, these exemptions were
unnecessary because of the lack of enforcement of the aforementioned
Ministerial Regulations.
Interestingly, certain provisions of the law, namely those that concern
abuse of dominance and mergers, were not immediately enforceable once
the law took effect. The law requires that the Trade Competition
Commission ("TCC") propose a threshold market share and/or sales figure
that determines whether an enterprise is "dominant," or whether a planned
merger would need to submit a pre-merger notification. The Cabinet must
endorse the proposed threshold figures before they can become law. After
six years, the Commission has not yet passed these threshold figures. This
is due mainly to strong opposition from large businesses and the
government's own lack of interest in enforcing the law because of its strong
ties to such businesses. Today, the business conduct of dominant players in
the market and all mergers and acquisitions essentially remain unregulated.
The TCC is composed of four bureaucrats and at most twelve
experts. 13 The Minister of Commerce, a politician, chairs the TCC, which
does not bode well for its autonomy from politics. The law, oddly enough,
stipulates that at least half of the twelve expert commissioners must be from
the private sector. Even more strangely, instead of conducting a search for
qualified and impartial representatives from the private sector, the
Department of Internal Trade requested three recommendations each from
the Federation of Thai Industries and the Thai Chamber of Commerce. 14 As
10 Thai Competition Act 1999, Thailand, Mar. 26, 1999 (1999), available at
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Thailand/Competition/thcom2.htm [hereinafter Thai
Competition Act 1999].
11 In case of abuse of dominance, words such as "unreasonably" and "without justifiable
reasons" provide a basis for a rule of reason approach. For the case of merger and certain
collusive practices, the notification requirement provides the administrative authority with
the discretionary power to assess the merit of practices on a case-by-case basis.
12 Ministerial Regulations are regulations passed by Ministries as prescribed in a
particular section of a particular Act. It has the status of a law. Section 5 of the Trade
Competition Act 1999 stipulates that the Minister of Commerce and the Minister of Finance
are vested with the power and duty to pass Ministerial regulations required by the Act. Thai
Competition Act 1999, supra note 10, §5.
13 The composition of the Trade Competition Commission is stipulated in Section 6 of
the Trade Competition Act 1999. Thai Competition Act 1999, supra note 10, §6.
14 Nipon Poapongsakorn, Institutional Arrangements for the Competition Authority in
Thailand 93 (Dec. 2003) (on file with the APEC-OECD Cooperative Initiative), available at
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big businesses tend to dominate these trade associations, the probability of
representatives of small- and medium-sized businesses obtaining a
nomination for commissioner is low. Consequently, large businesses are
over-represented on the Commission. Other experts on the Commission,
whether academics, professionals, or other private sector representatives,
are nominated by the Minister of Commerce and appointed by the Cabinet.
Therefore, it is likely that only those that are friendly, or at least not hostile,
to the government of the day are selected. The selection process is closed
to the public. The names of candidates, their qualifications, the selection
criteria, and the selection results are not disclosed.
The performance of the TCC has been dismal, especially after the
January 2001 installment of the new government dominated by large
businesses. The Committee met only nine times in six years, four of which
took place during the inaugural year. The latest meeting took place on May
14, 2004.15
According to the information provided on the Department of Internal
Trade's website, in June 2004, the Trade Competition Office reviewed
nineteen competition cases since its inception in 1999. It has deliberated on
three cases, seven cases are reportedly under investigation, and nine more
are awaiting submission for consideration and deliberation by the TCC.
The website neither provides details about the nature of the alleged anti-
competitive practices nor does it disclose the progress made in each case.
16
The information available in English summarizes the performance of the
TCC from 1999 to February 2002, but there have been no updates since
then. 17
The level of transparency with which the TCC operates deteriorates in
parallel with its performance. Recently, the Department of Internal Trade
decided to remove the record of complaints filed with the Office of Trade
Competition Commission ("OTC") from its website. Perhaps the list of
cases awaiting deliberation and consideration by the Commission was
getting too long, as the Commission has not met in eighteen months.
Although the minutes of each of the nine meetings of the TCC became
available on the Department of Internal Trade's website in 2005, they are
only one to two pages in length.
The Thai competition regime is currently in its darkest hours. But
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2003- 12/005.pdf.
15 Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand (2006), available at
http://www.dit.go.th (available in Thai) (last visited Feb 10, 2006) [hereinafter Department
of Internal Trade website].
16 id.
17 Department of Internal Trade, Summary of the Work on Trade Competition Act,
Thailand (2006), available at http://wwv.dit.go.th/eng/contentdetail.asp?
typeid=15&catid=108&ID=344 (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
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even during its brightest days, the implementation of the law was already
problematic, as evidenced by the four cases that were at the center of public
attention during the first two years that the law was in effect. These cases
include:
1. The cable television monopoly;
2. Whiskey and beer tied-sales;
3. Unfair trade practices in large retail trade; and
4. Exclusive dealings in the motorcycle market.
A. Case Study # 1: The Cable Television Monopoly
In the first case, the Consumer Foundation filed a complaint that the
cable television monopoly, the United Broadcasting Corporation, charged
an excessive monthly subscription fee.' 8 The company argued that it was
not a monopoly and that cable television was in direct competition with
local cable operators and many other substitutes such as video rental
services, movie theaters, satellite dishes, and free television channels. The
subcommittee investigating the case confirmed that the cable operator was a
monopoly in the Bangkok region, where other cable operators were absent,
but was not able to establish whether the fee charged was excessive.
However, it found that the company's failure to offer a lower-priced
package with fewer channels, known as the "silver-package," constituted a
breach of the concession contract. 19
The Commission concurred with the subcommittee that the cable
operator was a monopoly, but decided that the case was not within its
jurisdiction because cable television is a regulated industry. 20  The
Commission handed over the case to the Mass Communication
Organization of Thailand ("MCOT"), which regulates the cable television
industry, on the premise that complaints about the rates and packages
offered should be handled by a sector-specific regulatory body rather than
the general competition authority. The MCOT confirmed that the tariff was
not excessive because the company was facing an operating loss. 21 The
MCOT made no attempt to scrutinize the expense and cost figures of the
18 Unpublished Report of the Subcommittee Investigating the Cable Television
Competition Case (2001), available at http://www.info.tdri.or.th/reports/unpublished/
ubcpdf/content.pdf.
19 Id.
20 The Trade Competition Act 1999 does not address the issue concerning the overlap of
jurisdiction between the general competition authority and the sector-specific regulatory
body.
21 It should also be noted that the MCOT enjoys a 6% revenue share generated by the
particular cable television operator. In many developing countries, such conflicts of interest
that can hamper a regulator's impartiality are commonplace.
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cable monopoly, a normal procedure for a well functioning regulatory body.
The company, however, began to offer the less expensive option in order to
comply with the conditions stipulated in the concession. But the channels
available in the less expensive package were so unattractive that it did not
present subscribers with a real choice. It was only in March 2005 that the
company effectively launched different packages in order to widen its
customer base after the market became somewhat saturated with other
competitors.22
B. Case Study # 2: Whiskey and Beer Tied-Sales
In the second case, the Surathip Group, manufacturer of Chang Beer
and Elephant Brand Beer, and holder of an exclusive concession to produce
liquor/whiskey, allegedly tied the sale of its beers to the sale of a highly
demanded whiskey/liquor in order to take market share from its competitor
in the beer market.23 While the Commission found that the practice of tying
beer to whiskey sales constituted an obvious breach of Section 25 of the
Trade Competition Act, which addresses abuse of dominance, it also found
that retailers, rather than the manufacturer, were guilty of tying the
products. This finding is odd, given that retailers had no incentive to pursue
such a practice unless the manufacturer demanded it. The Commission also
ignored the fact that the manufacturer held a 25% equity share in many
retail stores, meaning that these retailers were likely to have acted on behalf
of the major shareholder. Despite the finding of a violation of the Act, the
Commission did not undertake legal actions against the retailers because
Section 25 of the law was unenforceable in the absence of a dominance
threshold.24
C. Case Study # 3: Unfair Trade Practices in Large Retail Trade
In the third case, local suppliers and smaller retail stores filed
complaints against large foreign multinationals such as Tesco of the UK
and Carrefour and Casino25 of France.26 While foreign retail companies
22Naspers, Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F), (Sept. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.naspers.com/pdfs/20-F.pdf.
23 U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Review of the Recent Experiences in the
Formulation and Implementation of Competition Law in Selected Developing Countries, 23,
U.N. Doc. UNTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/2 (2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
ditcclp20052_en.pdf.
24 Deunden Nikomborirak, Thailand, in COMPETITION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA
(Douglas H. Brooks & Simon J. Evenett eds., 2005).
25 In late 2005, a Thai partner bought back all equity shares of the "Big C" discount
stores from the Casino group of France.
26 See Department of Internal Trade website, supra note 15 (list of complaints available
in Thai); Nikomborirak, supra note 24, at 264-65 (table 8.7 lists complaints cases).
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compete rigorously among themselves, their extremely aggressive business
culture had caused tremendous friction with both large and small domestic
suppliers. The complainants alleged that some of these aggressive business
practices, such as mandatory enrollment in price promotion schemes,
preferential treatment for house brand products, and various fees including
a marketing fee or slot allowance, were unfair trade practices.
In January 2003, to appease a public outcry about unfair trade practices
of the large hypermarkets, the TCC proposed to set the sector-specific
threshold market share for dominance at 25%. Academics, businesses, and
civil society heavily criticized the proposal as discriminatory, claiming it
would apply only to retail businesses. A year later, a new Minister with
close family ties to a large local conglomerate involved in the retail
business withdrew the proposed threshold while it was still awaiting
approval of the Cabinet.
According to the minutes of the Commission's meeting in May 2004,
the Commission held that the sector-specific dominance threshold was
inappropriate and instead a general threshold should apply across all
industries.28 While this view is certainly correct, the move was a mere
tactic to further delay the establishment of the definition of dominance and,
hence, the enforcement of the law. The secretariat office again was tasked
to study and propose the optimum threshold market share and sales value.
The whole process had to begin anew, and no real progress was made.
Once again, to appease the persistent public discontent about large
retail stores' trade practices, the Thai Trade Competition Commission
decided to issue a "Retail Industry Code of Ethics." The Code, a guideline
for retailers rather than a law, describes practices considered "unfair,"
including sales of products below prices quoted on the invoice, retail price
maintenance, refusals to deal and price discrimination, exclusive dealings,
and product linkage. The Code is very broad in nature, merely listing types
of practices considered unfair in the absence of a valid efficiency defense.
It does not shed light, however, on what types of defenses would be
acceptable to the Commission. As expected, the voluntary Code has had
very little impact on the conduct of large retailers.29
27 Kallaya Laohaganniyom & Noah Brumfield, Thai Competition Law, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION REVIEW: THE 2005 AsIA PACIFIC ANTITRuST & TRADE REVIEW (2005),
available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/sr/sr'fullpage.cfm?pageid=124.
28 See Department of Internal Trade website, supra note 15 (minutes of the meeting
available in Thai).
29 See id. (Code available in Thai); Mark William, Competition Law in Thailand: Seeds
of Success or Fated to Fail?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 459 (2004) (English translation of the
Guideline).
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D. Case Study # 4: Exclusive Dealings in the Motorcycle Market
The fourth and last study is a landmark case. It is the first case where
the TCC found an infraction of the law and decided to take legal actions
against the defendant. In December 2004 Honda, a motorcycle
manufacturer that holds approximately 80% of the market share, allegedly
practiced exclusive dealing by prohibiting retail stores from exhibiting and
selling competing brands in the same store. Such an act, when pursued by a
supplier with significant market power, constitutes an abuse of dominance,
an infraction of Section 25 of the competition law. Retailers complained
that the manufacturer threatened to cease the supply of its products and to
open competing stores next door if they refused to become an exclusive
agent, meaning that retailers could not sell other competing brands.
Interestingly, the Commission found that the company had violated
section 29 of the law, which concerns unfair trade practices, rather than
section 25. Section 29 concerns trade practices associated with unequal
bargaining power between a seller and a buyer, such as that between a large
discount store and a small-scale supplier, or a franchisor and a franchisee.
Moreover, unlike section 25, section 29 is enforceable without establishing
the market dominance of the alleged business. The fact that this case was
handled differently from the whiskey and beer abuse of dominance case
raised suspicions of selective enforcement of the competition law in favor
of powerful local businesses and against foreign companies with little or no
political connections.
In sum, competition law in Thailand played almost no role in
enhancing the competitive environment in the domestic market during the
past six years. Its implementation has been opaque, selective and arbitrary.
Authorities do not investigate complaints properly and they make decisions
without supporting evidence or reasoning. The 1999 Trade Competition
Act has had a negligible impact on the trade practices of local enterprises
and on the overall competition in the domestic market.
III. WHAT WENT WRONG?
The Thai case illustrates that many things can go wrong with the
implementation of a competition law. The three contributing factors of this
apparent failure are: (1) the existence of strong political intervention; (2) the
lack of "due process" in the administration of the law; and (3) the absence
of interest in and support for the competition law from non-government
stakeholders, such as non-government organizations ("NGOs"), academics,
and the media.
By design, the TCC is vulnerable to political intervention. The
Minister of Commerce is the chairperson of the Commission and the
Minister nominates while the Cabinet approves other commissioners. The
Office of Trade Competition Commission relies entirely on the annual
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budget allocated by the government. Moreover, the closely interconnected
relationship between politics and business exacerbates this lack of
independence from the executive power, which leads to impartiality.
Unfortunately, big businesses have always been the major source of
campaign financing for all political parties in Thailand.30  Recently, big
businesses have entered directly into politics, 31 entrenching their grip on the
country's policy.
According to Nipon Poapongsakorn, 32 political interventions and
corporate lobbying-both explicitly and behind the scenes-occurred
throughout the existence of the Trade Competition Act, in particular during
the investigation periods. Perhaps the most blatant and damaging lobbying
by big businesses was the delay in promulgating the dominance threshold
that will make the provision on abuse of dominance enforceable.33 In June
of 2000, the TCC proposed a threshold dominance of 33.33% market share
and 1 billion baht sales revenue in the relevant market. With the prevalent
abuse of dominance cases being investigated at the time, it was hoped that
passing the threshold would ensure that the relevant provision would be
enforced. But opposition by the Federation of Thai Industries ("FTI") did
much to prevent the cabinet from approving the proposed definition of
market dominance.34 The new government that came into office in early
2001 decided to return the proposed dominance threshold to the Trade
Competition Office for review. A 50% market share threshold was the
counter-proposal by the business sector. The higher market share threshold
would severely circumscribe the scope of application of the law as only a
handful of companies would be classified as dominant. At this time, the
dominance threshold has not made it through the Cabinet, rendering the
provisions on abuse of dominance and mergers still ineffective.
Another study, by Suriyasai Takasila and Rajitkanok
Chitmunchaitham,35 attributes the lack of enforcement and the selective
enforcement of the competition law to conflict-of-interest problems inherent
among competition commissioners. The authors found that one of the
commissioners considering the tied-sale case of whisky and beer in the year
30 Nipon Poapongsakorn, Monopolies under Thai Capitalism, in Roo TAN THAKSIN 89-
131 (Jirmsak Pinthong ed., 2004) (in Thai).
31 Thailand's Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, is a telecommunications tycoon. His
cabinet consists of several well-known businessmen from large businesses from the
automobile, entertainment and food industries.
32 Nipon Poapongsakorn, The New Competition Law in Thailand: Lessons for Institution
Building, 21 REv. INDUS. ORG. 185 (2002).
33 Id.
34 BANGKOK POST, Oct. 2, 2000.
35 Suriyasai Takasila & Rajitkanok Chitmunchaitham, Monopolies and Politics, in
BUILDING CONSTITUENCY FOR COMPETITION POLICY AND COMPETITION LAW 3-1, 3-16 (2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.info.tdri.or.th/unpublished.
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2000 was a director of a company affiliated with the powerful whisky
conglomerate. The conglomerate is known to be one of the largest
contributors to all political parties, charities, and sports events and it is
staffed with high-ranking retired bureaucrats that have strong links with the
relevant regulatory authorities. Another commissioner was found to be a
director of a company affiliated with the cable television monopoly accused
of bundling cable services and charging excessive monthly fees. There is
no evidence that these commissioners recused themselves from meetings
that discussed the cases in which they had a direct or indirect financial
interest.
This brings us to the next factor that has a significant bearing on the
ultimate success or failure of competition law: administrative due process.
A transparent and objective enforcement procedure can, to a great extent,
protect itself from undesirable political interventions and lobbying. Due
process in Thailand's administrative branch is prescribed by the
Administrative Law, the Public Information Law, and various provisions
found in the competition law itself. For example, the Administrative Law:
" Prohibits officials with financial and non-financial (i.e., family and other
relatives) interests from being involved in the administrative procedure.
" Requires that both parties involved in the proceeding be given the chance to
present evidence and offer counter-evidence to the administrative officials.
* Requires that all government committees' decisions that have a bearing on
the private sector be recorded with details describing the minority views and
opinions, as well as the signatures of every commissioner. The decisions
must also be made publicly available according to the Public Information
Act 1997.
* Requires that all government agencies set a specific time frame for
responding to inquiries or complaints.36
Most of these provisions were imported into the Trade Competition
Act. Those that have been left out should apply nevertheless since the
Administrative Law stipulates clearly that the standard of administrative
procedures specified in other sui generis laws must, at a minimum, contain
all the provisions specified in the Administrative Law. Unfortunately, the
Office of Trade Competition Commission has failed to comply with most of
the provisions stated above.3 7 For example, as mentioned earlier, certain
commissioners were deliberating in cases in which they had a conflict-of-
interest. Commission decisions never specify the views of any of the
commissioners, let alone the minority views. Complainants are not
36 Nipon Poapongsakom, Institutional Arrangements for the Competition Authority in
Thailand (2003), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2003-12/005.pdf.
37 Id.
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informed about how the Trade Competition Office handles the cases and
how long each steps will take.
As mentioned earlier, a Commission's written decision on a
particular competition case offers no finding-of-fact reports 38 or rationale
supporting the decisions of the Commission. 39  The views of each
commissioner are also unavailable, let alone a record of who is in
attendance at these meetings. In fact, for the first few cases under
deliberation in the year 2000, records of any formal decisions could only be
found in newspaper interviews given by the Secretary of the Commission.
Furthermore, no evidence, statistics, data, or interviews resulting from the
investigations were available to the public. The minutes for those meetings
became available to the public online only in 2005. But, as mentioned
earlier, these minutes provided no information to support the Committee's
decisions in the competition cases. It is likely that the posting of the
minutes was done simply to comply with disclosure obligations stipulated
in the Administrative Law. The appalling lack of information available on
the TCC's website is clear testimony of the lack of transparency of the
40competition regime.
It is interesting to note that many developing countries are quick to
adopt western-style institutional structures and procedures when designing
their regulatory regimes, be it the composition of the commissioners or the
structural and financial independence of the organization. International
advisors as well have a tendency to benchmark new competition regimes
against those already established in more advanced economies. The
problem is that many developing countries operate under a very different
political, legal, social, and governance environment. Corruption and
political intervention may run broader and deeper than what developed
countries are accustomed to. Often rules, social and legal sanctions against
favoritism and patronage, or conflicts-of-interest in the administration of a
38 In fact, the Subcommittee responsible for the cable television case produced a
relatively comprehensive report that was submitted to the Competition Commission in the
year 2000. It found that the cable operator did abuse its monopoly power by denying
consumers the choice of a less expensive package, the silver package. It also questioned the
need to increase monthly subscription rates given the company's massive financial savings
from a merger with its only other competitor in the market in 1998. The committee failed to
address any of the subcommittee's findings, besides that the cable television operator is
indeed a monopoly in the relevant market. As mentioned earlier, it later decided to transfer
the case to the sector regulator. The OTC also failed to inform the public about the existence
of the particular report, which is currently available at http://www.info.tdri.or.th/
unpublishedpapers/.
39 Department of Internal Trade website, http://www.dit.go.th, which provides no details
regarding the Commission decisions to pursue or not to pursue a case, let alone investigation
reports. The commission's deliberation on a particular case is normally three lines long.
40 Trade Competition Commission, http://www.dit.go.th/eng (last visited February 21,
2006). The minutes of each of the nine Commission's meetings are available only in Thai.
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law are absent, weak, or lack compliance.
For example, the Thai Administrative Act, despite its relatively
advanced status, is silent on rules concerning communication between
commissioners and parties involved in a proceeding.4' Thus,
commissioners are able to arrange private meetings with either party
without any documentation of what information was submitted or
exchanged. Such laxity leaves the administration particularly vulnerable to
lobbying. Deunden Nikomborirak and Somkiat Tangkitvanich also found
that the law concentrates mainly on procedures concerning the issuance of
an administrative order that is binding on the parties but does not cover
procedures involving the making of an administrative rule that is binding on
all businesses. 42 This explains why there has been very little transparency
in the process of proposing the dominance threshold-an administrative
rule-by the TCC.
The need to establish transparency is not limited to the enforcement
procedure. Equally important is the selection process of commissioners.
One of the most difficult tasks facing a developing country in setting up a
regulatory regime is how to design a selection process that will beget
commissioners that are immune to political influence and business
lobbying. In such an environment, where the risk of regulatory capture is
high, transparency and due process in both the selection of commissioners
and the administration of the law is critical to the integrity and the
effectiveness of the competition regime.43
It is unfortunate that governance issues are often neglected in the
process of drafting a competition law. International benchmarking of laws
is often focused on the substantive law and fails to examine whether the
institution is independent from the executive power. An independent
competition authority that lacks transparency and accountability can
potentially inflict greater damage to the economy and individual businesses
than one that is subject to ministerial oversight. This is because at the end
of the day, while a politician is accountable to his or her electorate,
commissioners of an independent institution are not held accountable to
4 This is known as the "ex parte" rule. The rule states that no party or participant in the
proceeding shall submit ex parte communications to the administrator of the law and its
employees regarding any matter pending before the authority. See FDIC Law, Regulations,
Related Acts § 308.9, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-
1900.html#2000part308.9.
42 Deunden Nikomborirak & Somkiat Tangkitvanich, Research Paper: Building
Credibility for a Telecommunication Regulator 2-3, 28 (Thailand Development Research
Institute, Thailand's Telecommunication Sector Reform Project, August 2002).
43 Regulatory capture describes a situation where a state regulatory body is influenced by
the interest of the industry which it regulates. A detailed description of the term can be
found in M.E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECON. AND
LAW 267, 267-71 (1998).
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anyone.44
In the clear absence of political will and the administration's inability
to withstand the interference of its political superiors to enforce the
competition law, the fate of Thailand's competition law is in the hands of
non-government stakeholders-i.e., the academics, the NGOs, civil
societies, and the media. In an environment where money dominates
politics, only public pressure can ensure the successful enforcement of a
law that threatens the interests of powerful businesses.
This brings us to the third factor contributing to the failure of the
competition regime in Thailand: the lack of public support for, and interest
in, the law. Upon the inception of the law in 1999, public awareness and
support for the law was clearly absent. Most NGOs at the time focused
mainly on health and environmental issues, where the effects on the public
are more clear, visible, and immediate. Competition law, on the other hand,
was perceived as being about "business disputes" that did not involve
NGOs. Worse, the word "competition" is often negatively associated with
capitalism and free-trade, which left-leaning organizations stand against.
In the academic circle, knowledge of industrial organization is very
limited. One study found that in the year 2000 only fifteen universities
nationwide offered a course on industrial organization at the undergraduate
level and only five at the graduate level.45 From 1997 to 2001, there were
approximately three to five dissertations that concerned industrial
organization issues each year. With extremely limited education in the
field, it is therefore of no surprise that there is very little research work on
competition-related issues and very little comprehension of the subject
among policy makers and law enforcers in Thailand.
The media, the private sector, and the average person also have little
knowledge about Thailand's competition law and policy. Most could not,
and still cannot, distinguish between "competitiveness" and "competition."
Most will mistake competition policy for government measures that help
promote the competitiveness of the local industry. In the complete absence
of support and interest from the state, NGOs, academics, and the media, the
law was doomed to fail.
44For example, Nikomborirak & Tangkitvanich found that the independent
telecommunications regulator is not accountable to any one since it has its own revenue from
licensing fees and the law only requires it to report to parliament once a year.
Commissioners can only be dismissed by a two third majority vote of all commissioners,
rather than by the senate or the parliament to whom the commission submits annual reports.
Nikomborirak & Tangkitvanich, supra note 42, at 2-3, 28.
45 Deunden Nikomborirak, A Survey of Industrial Economics, 4 THAMMASAT ECON. J.
116 (Dec. 2004).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LACK OF ENFORCEMENT
The lack of enforcement of the competition law has left small- and
medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs") and consumers at the mercy of large
incumbents with market power. Obvious anti-competitive practices in the
whisky and beer tied-sale case expanded to include the tying of soda and
bottled drinking water to whisky and other liquors at the expense of
hundreds of large and small competitors in these markets. To counter the
unfair practices, small local bottled water producers collectively placed a
national television advertisement to condemn such acts. In the absence of
strong enforcement or an official remedy by the state oversight body, this
costly stunt by the local bottled water producers resulted in only a
temporary restraint on such practices, which have since continued.46
In the case of the cable television monopoly, a series of price increases
took place with impunity as the regulatory body, the MCOT, never took the
initiative to scrutinize the provider's cost figures or examine whether the
content offered in each package was commensurate with the fee charged.
Because the company was unprofitable, the regulatory body presumed that
the price charged to customers was not excessive and thus dismissed the
claims of monopoly pricing. As a result, subscribers have been forced to
pay increasingly higher monthly subscription fees as the operator continues
to add new and very expensive channels, such as the Premiership Soccer
League Channel, of which subscribers cannot opt out.
4 7
More broadly, the absence of an authority that advocates competition
implies that laws, regulations, and government policies that are
fundamentally anti-competitive are not being questioned. For example, the
Telecommunications Act was passed with a section that limited foreign
ownership in local telecom companies to only 25%. This foreclosed
competition from smaller local operators that had hoped to partner with
strong foreign telecom companies from overseas. The law served only to
protect large incumbents with strong financial backing that need not rely on
foreign capital or expertise. Meanwhile, several mergers that led to more
concentrated markets were allowed to proceed. These include a merger
between two major movie theaters,48 pulp and paper manufacturers, 49 and
46 Sairung Thongplon & Saowalak Cheevasittiyanon, Building Consumers' Alliance
against Monopolies, in BUILDING CONSTITUENCY FOR COMPETITION POLICY AND
COMPETITION LAW 8-1, 8-12 (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.info.tdri.or.th/unpublished.
47 As mentioned earlier, according to a Subcommittee Report the alternative package, the
silver package, did not represent a real choice for subscribers given the channels available
and the tariff charged. This package was later called the "Bronze" package with a price
reduction in March 2005. See supra note 18, at 29.
48 Competition to Fuel Mergers, THE NATION, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2005/01/06/business/data/business_1 5980936.html.
49 Keith Barney, At the Supply Edge: Thailand's Forest Policy (2001), http://www.forest-
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newspapers. 50  The inability to control mergers and hence market
concentration today will likely create competition problems down the road,
as merged entities with market power may abuse their newly acquired
market dominance to fend off competition from smaller competitors or new
entrants.
Needless to say, the public image of the effectiveness of the OTC and
the TCC has been reduced to nothing. The fact that the Commission's
reputation had been tarnished even before it has had a chance to establish
one does not help promote a competition culture in Thailand.
It is not only the public that has lost faith in this agency; the OTC's
own staff appears to have lost morale. The officers and employees of the
OTC have developed the technical and analytical skills required to deal
with competition cases and have put the acquired skills to use in preparing
competition cases for the Committee. But all their efforts appear to be in
vain as the Committee has failed to regularly meet to discuss these issues,
which reflects the general lack of interest in seeing the law enforced.51
Additionally, the list of complaint cases awaiting the Committee's
deliberation was removed from the website and a number of competent
officers were transferred to other activities. There seems to be no sign of
any progress. The lack of enforcement has harmed the Thai economy, as it
leaves SMEs vulnerable to the unfair practices of larger competitors,
buyers, and suppliers.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
Despite the lack of implementation of the competition law by the
government, the Thai case study offers several lessons that may be of some
relevance to other countries considering passing such a law. First, in the
absence of a clear political mandate to implement the law, it is unlikely that
the law will be enforced. Second, if and when the law is enforced, it tends
to be selective and arbitrary in the absence of rules and regulations that
ensure transparency and accountability of administrative procedures. Third,
in the absence of a political will to enforce the law, a country needs to adopt
a bottom-up approach to advocating the law and must rely instead on public
pressures to promote a competition regime. Building awareness and
trends.org/programs/pacificrim.htm.
50 Media Upheaval, THE NATION, Sep. 14, 2005, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/
specials/mediaupheaval/p 1 .php.
51 More recently, some of the qualified staff at the Office of Trade Competition
Promotion were assigned new tasks of promoting the franchise of low-cost fast food cart
vendors by the Department of Internal Trade in which it resides. The project is promoted by
the Ministry of Commerce to help keep down the cost-of-living during high oil-prices
periods. See The Elephant Talks 3 (2005), http://research.mulliscapital.com/products/
dailynotes/The%20Elephant%2OTalks DA05.08.18.pdf.
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appreciation of a competition law is a difficult and time-consuming process
that requires close coordination among academics, NGOs, and the media.
The Thai experience shows clearly that having a competition law is no
panacea in the absence of a political will to see the law properly enforced.
The promulgation of the law for the sake of fulfilling the spirit of the
Constitution does not bode well for the future enforcement of a paper tiger.
It could not stand against the powerful lobbying of large businesses that
have more recently become directly involved in politics. Political
interventions, big businesses' opposition, and institutional limitations prove
to be major hurdles in law enforcement. In such an environment, the
prospect of having a successful competition regime is indeed bleak. The
question is then, should a country where business and politics are closely
linked bother to have a competition law at all? And if so, what are the pre-
requisites that would help ensure an effective implementation of such a
law?
In hindsight, perhaps Thailand should not have passed a competition
law in 1999 when the political and social environment was not conducive to
successful implementation. Nevertheless, the law has contributed
positively toward the building of a competition constituency in Thailand
among politicians, academics, NGOs, and businesses, albeit still limited in
scale. Its mere existence puts politicians in a defensive position. The lack
of implementation of the competition law has always been one of the key
issues that the opposition party raises in a censure debate. 2 Business and
academic communities have also become more aware of the law despite its
lack of enforcement over the years. For example, the Director Certificate
Program offered by the Thai Institute of Directors53-a program aimed at
training corporate directors to be aware of and knowledgeable of their
rights, responsibilities, and accountability-includes a separate module on
competition law and policy. More universities, such as Bangkok
University, now offer courses on competition law and policy in their
graduate law schools.54
The law also helps promote capacity building in this field. The Trade
Competition Office, despite its inertia, continues to receive bilateral and
multilateral technical assistance from countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and
Australia and from organizations such as the World Bank and UNCTAD.55
52 Adisai Under Siege, THAI RATH, May 29, 2003, http://www.thairath.com/thairathl/
2546/page 1/may/29/p l3.asp.
53 Thai Institute of Directors Home Page, http://www.thai-iod.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2006).
54 Bu.ac.th, Admissions Manual, http://admission.bu.ac.th/
gsmsthaijlawscoursedescriptionsscourses-subject.htm.
55 Nipon Poapongsakom, Thailand Trade Competition Act (2003),
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2003-12/013 .pdf.
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Lastly, NGOs, civil societies, bureaucrats, academics, the private sector,
and the media have also grown accustomed to making references to the law
despite its inertia.
So, if a country were to pass a competition law for the first time, how
should it proceed? It is impossible to prescribe a general formula given that
each country has a unique economic, social, and political environment. It is
probably better to elaborate on what Thailand's case may have to offer in
terms of its experience. Certain countries may find that the Thai situation
closely resembles their own. Others may not be able to associate with the
kind of political, institutional, and social environment relevant to the Thai
case study.
A. Draft a Relatively Detailed Competition Law
The first observation is that in designing competition authority and
drafting a competition law, it is important to assess the integrity and
capability of various institutions that may be involved in the drafting and
implementation of the law. For example, in the case of Thailand, the
legislative process is generally much more transparent than the political
process, as it is subject to parliamentary scrutiny, while cabinet meetings
and decisions are often made with little monitoring and participation by
outsiders, be they the opposition party, the media, or the public. Under
such circumstances, it would be preferable to draft a relatively detailed
competition law to minimize the discretionary power of the administrative
authority, in particular when it is prone to political influences.56 It was
perhaps a mistake that the Thai competition law leaves a vital element of
the law-i.e., the dominance and mergers thresholds-at the discretion of
the administration.
B. Ensure Effective Checks and Balances Within the Regime
One may argue in this case that, even if the thresholds required for
implementation were available, the law would have never been enforced or
enforced only selectively. That is why it is also important to establish
effective checks and balances within the system. An appellate body that is
independent from the commission may help to ensure impartiality of the
decisions of the Commission. In Thailand, members of the appellate body
are also appointed by the cabinet,57 which does not bode well for
56 In Thailand, the Minister alone nominates the candidate for the highest ranking
bureaucrat, the Permanent Secretary, for Cabinet approval. The Permanent Secretary then
nominates the second-highest ranking bureaucrats, the Director-Generals of various
Departments within the Ministry, with the endorsement of the Minister, for Cabinet
approval.
57 Trade Competition Act, § 42 (1999), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/
Thailand/Competition/thcom2.htm.
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independence from politics. However, Thailand has had a relatively
respectable and independent Administrative Court that can help check that
procedures taken by the competition authority comply with the due process
and transparency prescribed by the Administrative Law. 8
Recently, Thais have grown accustomed to resorting to the
Administrative Court when the administration issues orders or make
decisions that are in clear conflict with public interest. 59 It is only a matter
of time before the TCC's neglect of its duty to enforce the law and its non-
compliance with the governance standard prescribed in the Administrative
Law will be challenged in the Administrative Court.
C. Prescribe Procedural Transparency, Accountability, and Due Process in
the Competition Law
Most administrative laws provide only general rules designed for
broad application to all sorts of administrative procedures and thus are
inadequate to guarantee an effective and objective implementation of the
competition law. It is therefore recommended that the competition law
contain provisions concerning the governance standard of the implementing
procedures, such as those concerning information disclosure, procedures for
handling complaints, handling of conflict-of-interest issues of
commissioners and staff of the Competition Office, and ex parte
communications with outsiders. A competition authority in a developed
country is likely to comply with higher governance standards already in
their general working environment. This is usually not the case for most
developing countries. That is why one needs to spend much time and effort
in building good administrative governance to ensure a successful
competition regime.
D. Build a Strong Competition Constituency at the Grassroots Level
In a country like Thailand, where political will to enforce the
competition law is clearly absent, reliance on public pressures from
consumer organizations, civil societies, academic institutions, NGOs, and
the media is vital for a competition law to succeed.
58 Tulsathit Taptim, Person of the Year-Ackaratorn Chularat: Defender of the Charter,
THE NATION, Dec. 30, 2005.
59 For example, in November 2005, the Consumers Foundation succeeded in securing an
injunctive relief order from the Administrative Court to postpone the initial public offering
of shares of the state electricity generation company. The Foundation accused the
government of failing to hold public hearings and alleged that the process was in
contradiction with the local law. The injunctive order came just one day ahead of the
government's planned flotation of the shares. Kenneth Crawford, Court Short-circuits Giant
Thai Energy 1PO, ASIA TIMES ON-LINE, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.atimes.con/
atimes/SoutheastAsia/ GK 17Ae02.html.
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In this regard, building public awareness about competition law and
policy becomes a prerequisite. One must realize that while a competition
law can be passed overnight, an effective implementation will take much
longer where local political, legal, institutional, and social environments do
not yet support it. It is important that the academics work closely with
NGOs and the media. The academic role is to provide education and
information on the issues at hand to other parties, while NGOs and civil
societies are activists. They are vocal and have the special capability of
organizing social movements on a grand scale. Well-informed NGOs are a
formidable force facing the government. The public and the media, on the
other hand, have their own specialized role in reaching out to the masses. A
journalist can usually communicate with the public better than an academic.
Hence, academics and journalists make a very effective team if they work
closely together.
There are also positive signs that, six years from the promulgation of
the competition law, a competition culture has begun to take root in
Thailand, albeit with little contribution from the competition regime itself.
For example, a planned privatization of the state-owned electricity
generating authority was abruptly halted one day before the planned IPO in
November 2005 by the Administrative Court. 60 A planned hostile takeover
of Matichon, a newspaper with a reputation for being independent, by a
politically connected entertainment conglomerate called "Grammy" was
cancelled due to massive public protests. 1 In another case, the application
to list on the Thai stock exchange by Thai Beverage Co. Ltd., the producer
of Chang Beer who was involved in tied-selling, was blocked by protests
from civic and religious groups.62 Companies with notorious competition
records that may have eluded state sanctions in the past, now face public
sanctions.
In the case of the IPO by the state-owned electricity company, several
NGOs filed the case in Administrative Court on the grounds that the
government was privatizing a state monopoly without a proper regulatory
body in place and that the process was illegitimate. Three years ago, these
groups were against any sales of state assets. Today, they appreciate the
importance of competition and regulation. It is a great milestone for
Thailand, indeed. Similarly, a merger was once considered a business
decision that did not concern the public. Today, critics cite the need to
6°A Needed Ruling in Favour of Caution, THE NATION, Nov. 16, 2005,
http://www.thaiwac.ias.chula.ac.th/Thai/PreviewE.php?qID=247.
61 Matichon Takeover Canceled, THE NATION, Sep. 15, 2005,
http://www.komchadluek.net/breaking/ read.php?lang=en&newsid=82397.
62 Thai Beverage PLC: Brewer Aiming for Dual Listing, THE NATION, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/01/04/headlines/index.php?news=headlines_195680
99.html.
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implement the competition act in order to systematically prevent mergers
and acquisitions that lead to excessive market concentration.
63
Passing a competition law and implementing it is always an uphill
battle. This is because the law not only runs against the interests of large
and powerful businesses, but it is also often associated with western
capitalism or free-market propaganda. It can easily fall prey to nationalistic
fervor that is, in some cases, drummed up by local monopolists themselves.
Thus, competition policy advocacy will be as important, if not more
important, than competition adjudication. A country needs to build a wide
competition constituency among the academics and civil society, as well as
the media. It is indeed a Herculean task that is worth undertaking.
VI. CONCLUSION
Competition law and competition institutions are one of the most
important elements that helps promote economic development and equality
in developing countries. This is because this particular law serves to
,,64 tndissipate "rents, which tend to accumulate among a privileged few in
countries where the rule of law is weak and cronyism is widespread. The
accumulation of rents can be particularly detrimental to developing
countries that are undergoing rapid economic growth. The concentration of
wealth can easily lead to widening income inequality, a major problem
facing many developing countries that threatens the sustainability of
economic growth. More importantly, concentration of wealth often leads to
concentration of political power where money matters in political pursuits.
This is likely to undermine the budding democracy found in many
countries.
The experience of Thailand shows that once big businesses are able to
take the political rein, they can easily entrench their monopoly strongholds
by influencing government policy. At this point, where the law is captured
by the state and big businesses, the chance of introducing competition in the
domestic market would be bleak. It is therefore of utmost urgency that a
developing country equip itself with a competition constituency that could
counter the formidable (financial and political) strength of incumbent
supplier/operators that would like to fend off competition in order to secure
their own private interests.
The lesson learned in this paper is that an unenforced competition law
can nevertheless yield valuable experiences and help build an effective
63 Planned Merger Awaiting Discussion with Matichon, THAI RATH, Sept. 15, 2005,
http://www.thairath.co.th/thairathl/2548/pagel/sep/16/pl-2.php.
64 Rents in economics refer to profits or investment returns that are excessive compared
to those available in a competitive market. See Armen Alchian, Rent, NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF THEORY AND DOCTRINE 141, 141-43 (J.Eatwell, M. Millgate & P. Newman
eds., 1987).
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competition constituency among NGOs, academics, and the media.
Without the law, one can never come to learn and appreciate its importance
when a competition-related case arises in the economy. As various non-
government stakeholders become more informed and active in public
affairs, it is only a matter of time before they will challenge an inert
competition regime, either legally or through public pressures.
On a final note, foreign technical assistance can indeed help many
developing countries to veer off this dangerous path. Foreign assistance
programs, however, need to be targeted at the right activities and the right
groups of people, subject to the political, legal, and social environments in
each country. The most important thing is that the assistance does not end
with the promulgation of the competition law itself, but that it extends into
the community. Building a competition law and policy constituency among
the various non-government stakeholders of the economy is the only way to
ensure an effective and sustainable competition regime in a country like
Thailand.
